Endotracheal intubation (ETI) is a valuable procedure which must be learnt and practised, and performing ETI on cadavers is probably the best way to do this, although lesser alternatives do exist.
Introduction
Endotracheal intubation, (ETI) is the placing of a tube in a patient's trachea and it is the preferred method of managing the airway in patients with life-threatening conditions.' 2 Adequate performance of endotracheal intubation requires the acquisition of knowledge and skills and the maintenance of expertise requires regular performance of the technique after it has been learned. Failure of the technique resulting in inadvertent intubation of the oesophagus is difficult to detect in the resuscitation milieu and will result in the patient's death if not rapidly corrected. 3 Physicians have practied ETI on the newly dead for many years4 and despite suggestions that it is unlawful and unethical4 many still consider that there is no better way to maintain the necessary expertise.5 67-10 Surveys of emergency departments
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in the United States of America and Australia suggest that one third to one half of emergency departments practise ETI on cadavers." 12 13 14 In 1988 Orlowski and colleagues published a paper supporting the practice of ETI on the newly dead and they consider this paper to be the first salvo in this debate. '5 In 1992 the Norwegian Medical Association ruled that the practice should be abandoned. '6 The British Medical Association and the Royal College of Nursing issued a joint statement condemning the practice in the United Kingdom,'7 although they suggested that practising ETI on cadavers with facial injuries was justifiable due to its educational value, so long as family consent was obtained, and that other intubation practice should occur in the anaesthetic room, on the living. In the New York Times, December 15, 1994 an article appeared under the headline "Hospitals use bodies of dead for practice", but it failed to ignite significant debate in the public media. '8 This paper will examine this practice under the headings: The argument for; About the body; and About consent, and then some possible future directions will be presented.
The argument for
Endotracheal intubation is an essential part of resuscitation.' 2 It has been suggested that techniques such as bag and mask ventilation'9 and laryngeal masks'7 would suffice in the emergency situation, however these suggestions have been legitimately refuted.
Iserson, the most vocal proponent for ETI practice on cadavers, states that "society trusts the emergency physician will perform lifesaving interventions with the maximum possible proficiency" and that "to do otherwise invalidates this trust"6 20 28 29 superior.
Delaying the pronouncement of death during resuscitation in order to teach or practise procedures is said to be a common event and has been described as a "deceitful and harmful hypocrisy".' 0 Further concerns Practising intubation on patients undergoing anaesthesia, as suggested by the representatives of the British Medical Association'7, raises further concerns. It is often performed without the patient's consent and it has the potential for injury, and possibly death. Even if consent is obtained the potential for harm remains and it has been suggested that patients prior to anaesthesia would be prone to coercion when consent is sought. 30 If we accept that ETI is important and that ETI training using cadavers is better than the alternatives then we must be able to argue our right to use cadavers in this way. The arguments stated in the literature centre around altruism, communitarianism and utilitarianism.
Iserson argues the "pervasive altruism" of most people and that seeking consent from relatives contravenes the patient's altruism. 5 36 Goldblatt, however, argues that quasi-property rights give the family fundamental rights to the body and that using a corpse without statutory authorization or proxy consent violates the common law. 4 Iserson counters that quasi-property rights apply only to ensuring an adequate burial and not to the right to refuse postmortem procedures.6 A legal precedent has not been established for ETI of cadavers and common law outcomes regarding unauthorized corneal graft harvesting and autopsies have been variable but at times they have come down in favour of the quasi-property rights of the family.23 37 In summary the corpse appears to have no legal standing but the family are afforded quasi-property rights which may extend beyond ownership for burial purposes.
Given the proven and appreciated repugnance for practising ETI on cadavers and the possibility of legal liability, should we be thinking about getting consent?
About consent
Despite the impression that usually consent is not sought the "no-consent" option is not argued in the literature but instead proponents of the procedure justify it on the basis of alternative forms of consent rather than none at all.
Implied consent describes consent that is implicit in the fact that the patient used the emergency services and it has been argued that therefore the patient is agreeable to all that entails, including being used for teaching. Implied consent criteria are commonly used for those who present, of their own volition for non-invasive medical care. However, patients who die in the emergency department most often do not present of their own volition but instead are brought in by others, usually ambulance staff, in a state of impaired autonomy. Furthermore, implied consent confers the right to administer that treatment the patient would reasonably expect at the time of presentation. In the emergency resuscitation scenario consent is also implied by the urgency and benefit of the treatment, neither of which apply to the scenario once resuscitation has ceased. Presumed consent therefore is an extraction of the arguments already outlined of altruism, communitarianism and utilitarianism. Although it is likely that most would consent (if they could) presumed consent does disadvantage the minority who would not.30 Formal application of a presumed consent rule for ETI of the recently dead mandates that the community should be well informed so that individuals have the opportunity explicitly to decline consent if they so desire. A number of countries have presumed consent laws for organ harvesting for transplantation, meaning that all deceased are eligible for organ harvesting unless they or their families specifically decline. The relevance of this model to the question of ETI of the newly dead is significant, and will be explored later in this paper.
Proxy consent recognises the quasi-property rights of the family. Goldblatt 30 Although this has been used to justify a "don't ask, don't tell" approach to ETI on cadavers it cannot be considered to be within "the normal scope of teaching" if the public are oblivious to it, many find it repugnant, and two countries have banned it. If we presume consent, and don't ask, we are obliged to tell. In so doing the significant minority who would not consent are protected by an opportunity to decline. To proceed with presumed consent therefore, we must have a wellinformed public and preferably statute to formalise their consent.
PROXY CONSENT?
If we cannot proceed without consent, and we cannot presume consent without a well-informed public, and the patient has not already given us consent then proxy consent is the remaining option. Furthermore there is probably some weak common law precedent to suggest that the family's quasiproperty rights to the body demand their consent. However, as Iserson has rightly suggested, proxy consent is likely to prove such a barrier that this valuable procedure will not be performed. 4 . PRIOR CONSENT FROM THE DECEASED? Gaining prior consent from a terminally ill patient is a reasonable but impractical solution to this problem. However, there are two further methods of prior consent which may offer better solutions.
According to a "Guttman scale", which suggests that if an extreme procedure is accepted then all of the less extreme procedures on the scale will also be accepted, then consent for postmortem ETI might be assumed if the patient has already consented to something more extreme. 40 Sanner performed a survey of public attitudes to autopsy, organ donation, and anatomic dissection and found that these procedures could be placed on a "Guttman scale" according to the procedure's "provocation of discomfort", with the ranking: autopsy, organ donation, anatomical dissection, in order of increasing provocation of discomfort. 40 Endotracheal intubation on cadavers was not discussed by Sanner, nor has it been ranked on a Guttman scale and it could be proposed to be either less or more repugnant than organ donation or autopsy on such a scale. However, if the public were well informed of its benefit and its harm it would seem reasonable to assume that it would fall on a scale below autopsy or organ donation. Thus it might be inferred that a patient who has already consented to organ donation (for example by indication on his or her driver's licence, as already occurs in a number of countries) would also consent to postmortem ETI. Further research on the position of postmortem ETI on a Guttman scale is required to support any such inference.
Finally, the most convincing solution to this problem is what Spital calls "mandated choice."30 Spital proposes a process whereby, as a matter of public policy, individuals must make choices on a variety of issues. Spital specifically discusses organ donation and such mandated choice occurs in a number of countries already with recording of the choice on, for example, the individual's driver's licence. This process informs and honours individual choice, it gives the significant minority the opportunity to decline and it avoids deception.
Summary
Endotracheal intubation is a valuable procedure which must be learnt and practised and performing ETI on cadavers is probably the best way to do this, although lesser alternatives do exist.
Performing ETI on a cadaver is viewed with a real and reasonable repugnance and if it is done without proper authorisation it might be illegal. Some form of consent is required. Presumed consent would preferably be governed by statute and should only occur if the community is well informed and therefore individuals are in a position of being able to decline. Currently neither statute nor adequate informing exists. Endotracheal intubation on the newly dead may be justifiable according to a Guttman scale if the patient has already consented to organ donation and if further research supports the relevance of the Guttman scale to this question. A "mandated choice" with prior individual consent as a matter of public policy is the best of these solutions, however until such a solution is in place we may not practise endotracheal intubation on the newly dead.
